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This is a response to the questions asked by Franco Passalacqua and Federico Pianzola as a 
follow-up of  the 2013 ENN conference. The discussions that originated at the conference  
were rich and thought-provoking and so the editors of  this special section of  «Enthymema» 
decided to continue the dialogue about the state of  the art and the future of  narratology. 
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1. Do you think that narratology has entered a phase of  consolidation? If  yes, what does this 
consolidation consist of ? What do you consider to be the most important aspect to pursue with the aim of  
consolidation? 
2. In your opinion, in what ways can narratology be said to diversify? 
 
One way of  presenting the development of  narratology as a discipline is to focus on its 
oscillations between what could be called consolidating and diversifying phases. The 
consolidating phases may be said to share three features: a general agreement on a 
theoretical paradigm concerning meaning making; a shared notion of  what constitutes a 
paradigmatic or prototypical example of  a narrative; an imperialistic and synthesizing 
move towards a unified theory of  all narrative. The diversifying phases may be 
distinguished through negations of  these three features but can also be positively 
described as engaging in multiple, heterogeneous theoretical dialogues, and as testing and 
questioning the limits of  what narrative may or may not be. 
Seen from our point of  view, narratology is now in a phase dominated by 
diversification, a phase that began during the late 2000s and is still gaining momentum. 
Before giving some examples of  the ways in which this diversification materializes today, 
a few words on these processes of  oscillation as we see them are called for. 
From its inception during the late 1960s, narratology, understood as a discipline 
studying narrative as narrative (both as an act and as an object), has been, a) only one 
among many approaches to narrative and b) at times preoccupied with a desire to come 
up with a unified theory of  all narrative. 
a) As Meister puts it in his overview of  the field, narratology is «not the theory of  
narrative but rather a theory of  narrative» (“Narratology”). Adopting axioms and 
methods from structuralism, Barthes, Todorov, Greimas, Genette, and others took 
primarily fictional, written narratives as their more or less explicitly selected case material. 
Prior to this, other traditions such as Russian formalism, German Erzähltheorie and 
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American rhetoric had been developing tools for analyzing and theorizing mainly 
fictional narration, while researchers from linguistics, most notably Labov, started using 
structuralist thinking to investigate the formal features of  non-fictional narration in 
conversational story-telling. With the narrative turn of  the late 1970s and into the 1980s 
and onwards – as Hyvärinen (“Towards a conceptual history of  narrative”) convincingly 
argues it makes sense to distinguish between several narrative turns – a massive 
proliferation of  interest in narrative began, initially dominated by history, psychology, 
and management studies, later followed by sociology, legal studies, medicine, and 
cognitive science. Partly in dialogue with some of  these emerging fields, partly inspired 
by other, often contextualizing insights, narratology has evolved into what most would 
agree to call a field of  postclassical narratologies. 
b) Narratology’s desire for a unified theory of  all narrative may, for the sake of  
exposition, be said to have strongly manifested itself  twice during this evolution: with 
French structuralism in the 1960s and with the cognitive narratology of  the late 1990s 
and 2000s. The synthesizing ambitions of  classical narratology have been commented on 
by many, and the critical points are well known. The reasons for the dismissal of  the 
ambitions of  the stucturalist endeavor can be boiled down to, first, a critique of  the 
limitations inherent in a de-contextualized and purely formal approach to narrative as a 
structure (and the concept of  structure as such) and, secondly, a critique of  the limited 
range of  empirical data taken to be relevant for the establishment of  general rules for 
the workings of  narrative. While in principle open to all the «prodigious variety of  
genres» as expressed by Barthes, classical narratology was in reality a specialized poetics 
of  written fiction. 
The synthesizing ambitions of  poststructuralist narratology have been most forcefully 
expressed by cognitive narratology. One of  its earliest and still most prominent 
contributions, Monika Fludernik’s ‘Natural Narratology’, set out to remedy the 
shortcomings of  classical narratology’s limited idea of  what constituted a proper 
narrative. Taking naturally occurring stories such as spontaneous conversational 
storytelling as the prototypical type of  narrative, Fludernik presented a model of  
narrative understanding that was sensible to meaning generated and changed by history, 
context, and reader inference; a model based on concepts being developed by the 
cognitive sciences, such as notions of  schemas, frames and scripts. David Herman’s 
influential and in many ways ground breaking work during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
took up the mantle from Fludernik and others and set out to make cognitive narratology 
«an interdisciplinary program for research» that «blends concepts and methods from 
narratology with ideas originating from psychology, artificial intelligence, the philosophy 
of  mind, and other approaches to issues of  cognition» (Narrative Theory and the Cognitive 
Sciences 20). This move towards a new consolidation of  narratology through a unified 
theory of  narrative was taken with cognitive science as the theoretical paradigm and with 
spontaneous conversational storytelling as the prototype of  the narrative act as well as 
the narrative form. 
Turning now to our own work on narratives, a common concern during the last 5-8 
years is an insistence that the unified theory of  narrative proposed by cognitive 
narratology gain its impressive synthetic abilities only by giving up on distinctions that 
we take to be crucial to theories of  what narratives are and how they function. Our 
moves towards diversification have been informed by three ideas. 
First, the idea that parts of  the theoretical paradigm of  cognitive sciences is at best 
questionable. One example would be the notion of  Theory of  Mind, which is the idea 
that humans are able to understand desires and beliefs of  other humans because of  the 
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ability to theorize or simulate the existence of  a mind in the other person, a process 
often referred to as real life mind-reading. By researchers such as Palmer, Zunshine and 
Herman the notion of  Theory of  Mind was imported into narratology to advance and 
prove the thesis that our engagements with fictional and non-fictional narratives operate 
according to similar logics, or as Herman put it: our «encounters with fictional minds are 
mediated by the same heuristics used to interpret everyday minds» (Herman, 
Introduction). Recent philosophical and psychological work on Theory of  Mind has 
severely criticized the notion, however, to the point that many have simply abandoned it 
completely (Iversen, “Unnatural Minds”). 
Second, and connected to this, the idea that fiction or fictionalization makes a 
difference. While our understanding of  fictional and non-fictional narratives on a very 
basic level may be said to draw upon operations taking place in the same brain and/or 
body, the differences between the meaning making procedures facilitated by fictionalized 
and non-fictionalized discourse are different on levels that matter more to a theory of  
narrative as well as to our everyday lives. The observation that we often or perhaps even 
mainly use protocols designed for real world use when engaging with fiction does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that we use only those protocols, especially when 
dealing with non-conventional narratives. The matters of  fiction matter a great deal to 
actual work on narratives that diverge from norms and conventions, either for strategic 
or symptomatic reasons. In dealing with consciousness attribution in non-conventional 
narratives it becomes evident that we ascribe different statuses to fictive and non-fictive 
consciousnesses, and that these ascriptions often dictate different interpretational 
strategies with regard to our sense-making activity (Iversen, “Broken or Unnatural?”). 
Third, the idea that positioning conversational narratives as the prototypical narrative 
runs the risk of  marginalizing forms and functions of  narratives that subvert, play with, 
diverge from, question or challenge the parameters of  natural telling and the natural as 
such, or even that the so called narratives are not necessarily primary to unnatural 
narratives but rather narratives subjected to specific conditions that do not apply to all 
narratives. Unnatural narratology was launched as an attempt to analyse such other 
narratives not as negations of  the normal but as culturally, intellectually and emotionally 
important contributions in their own right (Alber et al.). 
It is important to stress that several of  the recent and ongoing moves towards 
diversification do not happen solely through a dismantling of  the attempts to consolidate 
via a unified theory. Many of  the narrative turn's approaches have developed concepts 
and notions that call for collaborations and combinations across what used to be a gap 
between pure narratology and other types of  research on narratives. These developments 
are closely tied to the widening and diversification of  the object of  narratology: when 
leaving the safe haven of  the autonomous, invented, written and complete narrative and 
venturing into fragmented, interventional, interactive and emerging types of  narratives 
and narrative acts, collaborations with fields such as identity studies, linguistics, sociology 
and cultural studies become fruitful. 
 
 
2a. Does diversification imply more double entry narratologies (cognitive n., feminist n., unnatural n., 
etc.)? If  yes, what is still missing for a more complete account of  narrative phenomena? 
 
We do not think of  double entry narratologies as something desirable in and of  itself. 
And we think that it is often the case that different interests are perfectly capable of  
sharing the same vocabulary and even many of  the same assumptions. For example this 
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would seem to be the case for feminist narratology and rhetorical narratology where it is 
surely possible that a rhetorical analysis can highlight questions about, say, gender, and 
that a feminist approach can show new aspects of  rhetorical situations (Lanser). The 
same may hold true for cognitive and rhetorical approaches (Phelan). 
Then, some other approaches seem more fundamentally incompatible. This would 
hold true for instance for cognitive theory and most of  unnatural narratology (even if  
Jan Alber is an exception in his attempt to combine the two). 
One idea, we strongly want to resist, is the idea that one unified theory should and 
could explain all different kinds of  narrative, literary and non-literary, fictional and non-
fictional, and what we call natural and unnatural. We are especially wary about the guise 
in which we find this idea in many mind-oriented and cognitive approaches, where it 
seems to us to amount to an erasure of  important differences. For instance much of  the 
introduction to Herman’s impressive anthology The Emergence of  Mind is based on a 
refutation of  what he calls the Exceptionality Thesis. He directly connects this thesis to 
the question of  unnatural narratology and to theorists like Alber, Mäkelä, Richardson, 
and Skov Nielsen (11). Herman writes that «[…] the questioning of  the Exceptionality 
Thesis is in a sense the starting point for all the approaches to fictional minds outlined 
by the chapters in this volume […]» (Introduction 18), and refers to almost every 
contributor in the volume as «anti-exceptionalist» (20, 21, 22). The exceptionality thesis, 
then, is the thesis that we approach fiction and non-fiction by means of  different 
protocols for reasoning and with different interpretive strategies, and that, for example 
«[…] readers' experiences of  fictional minds are different in kind from their experiences 
of  the minds they encounter outside the domain of  narrative fiction […]» (8). 
For us the aim is certainly not to replace cognitive theories with unnatural ones, or to 
say that it is not the case that all narratives are natural, but that they are, instead, all 
unnatural. The difference is not that cognitive theory thinks all narratives are natural and 
we think the reverse. The difference is that we want to distinguish between what we 
consider fundamentally different narratives whereas most cognitive theory does not. 
Therefore, we do not think that the cognitive approach can stand alone, and we want to 
insist on the difference that some narratives make – especially for interpretation. To give 
just one example, we argue that when the mind-content of  characters (other than of  a 
character narrator herself/himself) are rendered it is sometimes necessary, often profitable 
and nearly always possible to use different interpretive protocols than those we use in 
everyday life. 
This brings us to the very expression unnatural narratives, which for us first and 
foremost takes on meaning in relation to what it is not: natural narratives. Most 
prominently the term natural has been applied to narrative theory by Monika Fludernik in 
Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology. Here, she describes the term as follows: «Natural narrative 
is a term that has come to define ‘naturally occurring’ storytelling […] What will be 
called natural narrative in this book includes, mainly, spontaneous conversational 
storytelling a term which would be more appropriate but is rather unwieldy» (13). 
This is the first and most important of  three different meanings that feed into the 
term natural narratology. Its source is Labov and linguistic discourse analysis. The second 
meaning of  the term natural comes from Natürlichkeitstheorie which uses the term to «[...] 
designate aspects of  language which appear to be regulated and motivated by cognitive 
parameters based on man’s experience of  embodiedness in a real-world context» (17). 
Whereas both of  these two meanings function as descriptive denominators of  a certain 
kind of  narrative or language, the third one is on a completely different level and refers 
to the readers’ reaction towards certain types of  narrative, literature or discourse. It comes 
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from Culler and his use of  the term naturalization to designate readers’ efforts to make 
the strange and deviant seem natural and thus to familiarize it: «Culler’s naturalization in 
particular embraces the familiarization of  the strange» (31). Again, there is no quarrel 
possible about the fact that natural narratives of  the kind described by Fludernik exist, 
but three equally important points are that we should not necessarily privilege these and 
that we should certainly not think that all narratives are or behave like natural ones, and 
finally that readers are not forced to naturalize. Fludernik writes: «When readers read 
narrative texts, they project real-life parameters into the reading process and, if  at all 
possible, treat the text as a real-life instance of  narrating» (“New Wine in Old Bottles?” 
623). It is worth noting, first, that as a descriptive statement as opposed to a normative 
statement about what readers should do, it hardly covers all readers, nor all lay readers; 
and second, that even if  this is what many readers tend to do, we are not obliged to 
repeat the projection at a methodological level. Familiarization, or what Culler calls 
naturalization and Fludernik narrativization, is a choice, and whether the choice is 
conscious or automatic, it remains a choice and not a necessity. A different choice in the 
form of  un-naturalizing interpretation is equally legitimate and rewarding in many texts. 
Let us look at a specific example: Glamorama by Bret Easton Ellis is in some respects 
a classical doppelgänger-narrative. The protagonist and first person narrator Victor Ward 
apparently has a double, and gradually this double takes over his identity. In the end one 
Victor – and everything seems to indicate that he is the one we have followed 
throughout most of  the book – dies in Italy while the other Victor, his double, enjoys 
life in New York. The really odd and unnatural thing about Glamorama, however, is that 
not only does the double overtake the identity of  the first-person narrator on the 
thematic level and in the narrated universe; he even becomes the enunciator of  the 
pronoun I. The double becomes the narrating narrator and thus takes over part of  the 
narration. 
This phenomenon certainly does not correspond to any real-world, natural discourse. 
And the understanding of  just the basic events and the storyline in Glamorama hinges 
crucially on understanding this pronominal takeover. 
The more general point is that some works – Glamorama among them – can be 
interpreted as unnatural in the sense that they designate and refer to a character with the 
first person pronoun I without emanating from that character. This form can be 
interpreted as unusual, strange or experimental, and our more general claim is that it is 
paradigmatic for unnaturalness that we find even in some of  the most traditional 
fictional first person forms, such as, for example, the classic detective novel. Take, for 
instance, the following short excerpt from Chandler: 
 
The next morning was bright, clear and sunny. I woke up with a motorman's glove in my 
mouth, drank two cups of  coffee and went through the morning papers. [...] I was shaking 
the wrinkles out of  my damp suit when the phone rang. (40) 
 
There is no zero focalization here and no transgressions of  point of  view. This prose 
is not experimental with regards to the narrative situation. Yet, what exactly is the 
relationship between mood and voice; between character and words? It seems equally 
unlikely that Marlowe should ever write, speak or think exactly these words during or 
after the action. The reader would be hard pressed to imagine that he thinks this to 
himself  using the preterit tense while hung-over. To imagine instead that Marlowe, in his 
old age, would occupy himself  with autobiographical writings during quiet nights collides 
with the picture of  Marlowe provided. Thus, every time it says in the text, for example, 
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«I walked», «I drank a whiskey», I refers to Marlowe, but Marlowe himself  is not saying 
anything about what he did or drank. This, at least, is our contention. It is un-
naturalizing in its assumption. It is an interpretational choice competing with other 
choices that might want to connect character and words and to ask – also in this case – 
about the occasion and purposes of  the narration at the character’s level. From an 
unnatural point of  view, we need not impose real-world necessities on all fictional 
narratives. We need not put all narratives into communicational models based on real-life 
storytelling situations. 
One consequence is that the reader can interpret mind-representations as 
authoritatively rendered in a way that distinguishes them from any representation of  real 
minds and that foregrounds the difference between invented and reported story worlds 
and minds. What connects the unconventional and unnatural first person narratives like 
Glamorama with conventional, unnatural third person with zero focalization is that they 
allow the reader to make interpretational choices that are un-naturalizing in the sense 
that she can trust as authoritative and reliable what would in real life be impossible, 
implausible or, at the very least, subject to doubt. 
 
 
2b. Or does diversification, perhaps simultaneously, involve a look at the various scientific cultures 
underlying research programs in narrative theory, past and present, but also non-Western? As 
theoreticians address issues of  cognition and context in narrative, in what ways should the role of  poetics 
and rhetoric in narratology be rethought? 
 
Let us begin with the latter question, which presupposes a temporal development in 
narratology from formal to functional interests. While we might agree to such a sketch 
when concerned with the unifying phases of  narratology – from structuralist to 
cognitive narratology – we would hesitate to equate this sketch with the full range of  
narratology as a discipline for several reasons. First, the dichotomies set up by the sketch 
call for conceptual elaborations if  they are to carry much weight. What is implied in the 
concept of  cognition as opposed to the concept of  poetics? What understanding of  rhetoric 
would be opposed to or very different from context and vice versa? Secondly, the focus 
on the unifying trends of  narratological research leave much important work on 
narratives out, including work that precisely sets out to bridges dichotomies such as the 
ones hinted at here. One of  the important side effects of  the often eclectic processes of  
diversification is the need to reflect upon the scientific adherence and heritage of  what is 
being brought together to explain the forms and functions of  specific types of  narrative. 
These processes enabled the incorporation and further development of  parts of  some 
contributions without necessarily buying into every precondition of  the paradigm from 
which they were inspired. A small example of  such a process could be the way parts of  
the newly developed reading tools from cognitive narrative (such as the idea of  
experientiality or the notion of  social minds) have influenced readings of  unnatural 
narratives (Iversen, “In flaming flames”; “Broken or Unnatural?”). 
 
 
3a. With respect to question 2, what contributions can each narratology or narrative theory bring to the 
others? To what extent can concepts and methods travel and be shared among different theories? And 
between narratology and other disciplines? 
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The interdisciplinary openness and the capability of  fostering travels between 
approaches to meaning making remains a key to the relevance and impact of  
postclassical narratologies. Most recent work in the discipline is in close dialogue with 
multiple approaches and assumptions. Our work on unnatural narratives and the 
specificity of  fictional narratives is clearly indebted in many ways to the work of  Cohn, 
Fludernik, McHale, Culler, Phelan and others and we have been fortunate to see our 
work having some influence the other way just as it also influences parts of  other 
subfields of  narratology. 
One example of  this interaction is the collaboration established between us and 
rhetorical narrative theorists like James Phelan and Richard Walsh resulting in joint 
articles and in Phelan contributing to the recent Poetics of  Unnatural Narrative. At the 
centre of  these collaborations are discoveries following in the wake of  the extrication of  
fictionality from fiction in the generic sense that Walsh initiated in his groundbreaking 
2007 book. One such discovery being that fictionality in the form of  the intentional use 
of  invented narratives is overwhelmingly prevalent in numerous areas of  society, politics 
and culture. It is a vehicle for negotiating values, weighing options, and informing beliefs 
and opinions. Yet, fictionality is almost completely unstudied and often even 
unacknowledged outside the field of  generic fiction where we expect to find it. This 
discovery has the potential to thoroughly impact several disciplines. It allows us to 
examine, e.g., how fictionality is used in modern politics as a means to persuade, argue, 
build ethos, etc. An obvious example being the ways in which Barack Obama very 
deliberately uses fictionality as a rhetorical strategy. The referring to his opponent as 
suffering from the non-existing disease «Romnesia» and the alleged presentation of  his 
birth video being two examples. It also opens for questions such as how fictionality can 
be an indispensable part of  telling about a historical past that often involves atrocities 
that it would seem scandalous to fictionalize. Art Spiegelman’s instantly canonized 
graphic novel Maus, where Jews are portrayed as mice, Germans as cats, etc., is a key 
example of  the impact of  a work that uses fictionalization in order to present an 
atrocious past. And it reflects back on our understanding of  generic fictions such as 
novels and allows for questions like: why and how can generic fiction affect our 
understanding of  and reasoning about what is true and real and influence the terms – 
ethical, emotional, ideological – in which we do so? 
 
 
3b. Do you think that narratology as a consolidating discipline should be concerned by issues of  
incommensurability due to the different ontologies and epistemologies underlying each theory or research 
program? 
 
This last question is difficult for us to answer since it seems to presuppose that 
narratology is a consolidating discipline. We think that descriptively it is not the case and 
normatively it should not be the case that narratology must consolidate itself  as one 
unified monolithical theory. Therefore we think that narrative theory should be very 
concerned with the different ontologies and epistemologies – not only and maybe not so 
much of  each theory or program, but also with the different ontologies and 
epistemologies of  different forms of  narrative. It is our contention that we lose out on a 
lot about fictional narratives if  we treat them as if  they were non-fictional, and that 
similar differences persist between visual and non-visual, natural and un-natural, situated 
and un-situated etc. We are confident that there is much and very exciting work to be 
done to examine and to compare, partly mono-disciplinarily, partly interdisciplinarily, 
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how fictionality and how narrative manifest themselves across media and genres in 
political, philosophical, literary, historical, and conversational discourse without erasing 
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